Changes in
the landscape of
media ownership worldwide
Steven
Barnett *
Introduction
My
brief is to look at changes in media ownership
regimes around the world, and I want to talk
about developments in some European countries as
well as the US and Australia. One of the
advantages of university teaching is having
access to bright foreign students who are happy
to do research for you, and I've had a couple
working on recent developments in certain
countries which I'll come on to. I want to go a
step further than a straightforward description
of trends in ownership legislation and talk about
the bigger picture: the reasons why these changes
might be happening now, and more importantly the
implications for independent journalism around
the world.
I want to start
with a few comments about the big picture - what
are the pressures for change, why is it that we
seem to be witnessing a wholesale restructuring
of media ownership statutes and what are the
forces driving it. Then I'll go into some more
detail about some individual case studies, and
finish with what I hope will be the core of our
subsequent discussion - the implications for a
free press and quality journalism.
The most obvious
structural shift is the impact of globalisation.
This is an ill-defined and nebulous term which is
often quoted as a major agent of change, so it's
worth spending a bit of time detailing exactly
what it means for international media.
Since the 1970s,
a number of factors have transformed the nature
of the global economy: a wider choice of
locations for capital investment; the 24 hour
presence and importance of global financial
markets; the rise and increased financial muscle
of transnational corporations; and, vitally, the
communications technology on which all these
factors rely for smooth and efficient operation.
The emerging global corporations are constantly
seeking expansion or, in the present economic
climate, simply survival. In the search for
further investment or expansion opportunities,
they will seek to influence and mould the
boundaries of any state regulation which tries to
limit market opportunities in the public
interest.
At the same
time, the political landscape has also been
transformed to accelerate the process of
globalised trading: the breakdown of the old
Soviet Union, and the emergence of capitalism as
the only viable means of existence - as in
Francis Fukayama's thesis about the End of
History - means that production, distribution and
selling can take place virtually anywhere in the
world. Politically, throughout the developed
world, the last 20 years have seen an astonishing
unanimity about the kinds of political rhetoric
being employed by virtually all parties across
the political spectrum. Liberalisation, the free
market, deregulation and withdrawal of state
intervention have become the new battle cries,
while rival parties quarrel only about the speed
and extent of withdrawal of the "nanny
state". It is now just as important to
achieve credibility with the financial markets
and business leaders as with the ordinary
electorate, and that means adapting policies in
accordance with corporate requirements.
The impact on
domestic policy making extends beyond media
policy to almost every aspect of decision making.
While politicians claim to be acting in the
public interest, and still talk about the
importance of community and collective welfare,
in practice much of the decision-making
flexibility has been finessed by the need to
placate the private sector.
This process is
exacerbated by two separate factors, one general
and one related specifically to the media sector.
First, there is the vast gulf in lobbying power
between on the one hand the corporate interests
wishing to push back the boundaries of state
intervention, and on the other the public
interest and consumer groups attempting from an
array of different perspectives to persuade
governments to put citizens before corporations.
This is particularly true in Europe at the EU
level, where public interest groups find it
difficult to operate across national boundaries
while global corporations can invest hugely in
identifying which European directorates and
commissioners to target and then overwhelming
them with arguments for looser regulation.
Proposals for regulating ownership at the
European level were dropped as a result.
Second, within
the media sector, media owners have access to the
one of the key drivers of opinion formation - the
mass media themselves. As consolidation increases
between newspapers, TV, online and other areas of
publishing, different parts of a media empire can
be exploited not just to cross-promote other
parts of the empire but to promote forceful
arguments about how governments should be
legislating in the very areas which might limit
corporate expansion in that field. An excellent
example within the UK is the way in which Rupert
Murdoch's newspapers have consistently argued for
limits on the BBC's freedom to operate. These
newspapers are likely to play a vociferous role
in the debate on renewal of the BBC charter which
expires in 2006. Of course, if the main corporate
beneficiary also happens to be prime minister -
as in Italy - lobbying yourself through your own
newspapers becomes less essential.
On top of
globalisation, there are the technology
arguments. There is no doubt that technology is
changing what is possible. You can read today's
paper on your computer, catch up with a programme
you've missed on your mobile phone, pause a
programme in real time with a PVR box like TiVo
or SkyPlus. In those senses, there is convergence
of screen and print and "convergence"
continues to be a major battle-cry from those who
seek to remove traditional regulatory structures
in electronic media.
The problem with
this argument is that there is actually little
sign of convergence on the ground in patterns of
consumption. Most people do not watch TV on their
computers or mobiles, nor download newspapers
from the internet. There is some evidence of slow
change, but convergence is being exploited as a
motor of regulatory change, even if consumer
behaviour so far renders it a redundant concept.
Even if broadband cable or telephony can
genuinely wire up millions of people to the net,
there is little evidence so far that this will
revolutionise traditional media behaviour. Most
realistic forecasts suggest that any online
revolution is at least 20 years away, and is
probably greatly overstated anyway.
So that's a
fairly crude attempt to paint a big picture,
which I think offers some clues to what's
happening across the international stage. There
are still a sufficient number of national
cultural, social and political differences for
the actual legislative changes to differ from
country to country, but I would certainly argue
that those differences are simply a matter of
scale rather than direction. The forces of
deregulation and corporatisation are gathering
pace and the consequences - as I will come on to
explain - are a tendency towards monopoly, loss
of diversity and innovation, less risk taking and
more homogenised forms of journalism which are
less equipped to challenge vested interests.
The
USA
Now to the
examples, starting with the home of corporate
life - the USA. At the end of May, protesters in
America staged demonstrations in more than a
dozen cities urging federal regulators to reject
changes in American media ownership rules. In Los
Angeles people marched outside Clear Channel's
radio station KFI with signs reading, "No
Choice, No Voice: Reclaim Our Airwaves."
This direct action accompanied the written,
telephoned and emailed protests of 750,000
Americans with the same message to the Federal
Communications Commission: that allowing large
media companies to own television, radio and
newspaper in the same cities stifles diversity
and is fundamentally anti-democratic.
This was
certainly not a protest confined to the left of
the political spectrum. Opponents included the
ferociously right-wing National Rifle Association
as well as well-known conservative columnists
like William Safire. In the New York Times,
Safire blasted the current affairs programmes of
the main television networks because they
"found the rip-off of the public interest by
their parent companies too hot to handle".
He called on the right, in particular, to rise up
against the FCC's position.
What prompted
these outbursts were proposals on media
deregulation on which the Federal Communications
Commission was about to decide. In the event, the
protests went unheeded as the FCC's commissioners
voted along party lines 3-2 on 2nd June to remove
some long-standing restrictions on media
ownership. The main proposals which the three
republicans voted through to relax ownership
restrictions were:
- Cross-ownership.
The ban on owning a newspaper and
television or radio stations in the same
city to be lifted in large markets served
by nine or more television stations. In
markets with 4-8 TV stations, one company
can own a newspaper, a TV station and
half the radio stations it would be
entitled to; or a newspaper and all radio
stations allowed under the rules; or two
television and some radio stations but no
newspaper.
- National TV
limit. Broadcast networks (ABC, CBS etc)
can own TV stations reaching 45% of the
national audience rather than the current
35%.
- Ownership
limits of local TV. In markets of 18 or
more stations, one company can own 3
stations as long as only one is in the
top four. In markets with 5 or more TV
stations, the limit is 2 stations with
only one in the top four.
The current
prohibition on one of the top four networks (ABC,
CBS, NBC, Fox) buying any of the others remains.
Supporting these proposals, the FCC chairman
Michael K. Powell said the new regulations were
"modern rules that take proper account of
the explosion of new media outlets for news,
information and entertainment, rather than
perpetuate the graying rules of a bygone
black-and-white era". This was echoed by his
fellow republican commissioner Kathleen Q.
Abernathy:
"For me,
given the rules we adopt today, the breakneck
pace of technological development, and the
ever-increasing number of pipelines into
consumers' homes, it is simply not possible to
monopolize the flow of information in today's
world."
By contrast, the
two democrat commissioners who voted against the
proposals were scathing in their criticisms and
in their analysis of the implications. Jonathan
S. Adelstein called it "the most sweeping
and destructive rollback of consumer protection
rules in the history of American
broadcasting". In his dissenting statement,
he drew attention in particular to three vital
arguments against allowing more consolidation in
the media marketplace.
First, there is
the impact of the enormous lobbying power of the
media corporations and their ability to drive
policy priorities: "In the end, this Order
simply makes it easier for existing media giants
to gobble up more outlets and fortify their
already massive market power. It capitulates to
many of the longstanding demands of the media
companies we oversee".
Second, he drew
attention to the actual on-screen effect of
greater consolidation and the unproven
assumptions of those who argue for its benefits:
"As big media companies get bigger, they're
likely to broadcast even more homogenized
programming that increasingly appeals to the
lowest common denominator.... in the absence of
some other compulsion, the logic of marketplace
competition and the media companies' fiduciary
responsibility to shareholders will require them
to maximize profits rather than serve the public
interest. The record does not support the
dangerous assumption that the many mergers
contemplated under these rules will invariably
serve the public interest".
Third, he made
the crucial link between the need for regulation
and the role of the media in sustaining a healthy
and dynamic democracy - particularly unusual in
American political culture where the free market
is assumed to be politically "neutral"
and any state intervention is deeply distrusted:
"It
violates every tenet of a free democratic society
to let a handful of powerful companies control
our media. The public has a right to be informed
by a diversity of viewpoints so they can make up
their own minds. Without a diverse, independent
media, citizen access to information crumbles,
along with political social participation. For
the sake of our democracy, we should encourage
the widest possible dissemination of free
expression through the public airwaves."
The combination
of this outspoken dissension and the widespread
concern being expressed at grass roots levels has
produced something of a stand-off. Both the
Senate and House of Representatives - each of
them held by the Republicans - have passed
spending bills which block these deregulatory
rules, and 10 days ago a US federal court in
Philadelphia ruled against the plans taking
immediate effect. Further court hearings are due
this year. Meanwhile, the four big networks have
launched an advertising campaign aimed at opinion
formers restating the case for the FCC rules to
be retained.
I have
deliberately spent some time on the American
position for two reasons. First, as the natural
home of arguments against state regulation and in
favour of market solutions, it perhaps offers
some foretaste of what will happen elsewhere in
the world: that at some point in the corporate
drive towards consolidation, it is possible to
mobilise non-corporate citizen and consumer
groups to oppose such deregulatory proposals in
sufficient numbers to make it at least
politically uncomfortable if not unsustainable.
Second, the
American example demonstrates how political media
ownership decisions have become, and how
inextricably bound they are to the desire for
existing administrations to stay in power. This
becomes especially important in countries like
the UK, as we shall see, when significant
proportions of the national press are owned by
the very corporations which are lobbying for
changes and which can potentially exercise
substantial influence on the opinions and voting
intentions of electors.
Australia
Similar attempts
at liberalisation by the Howard government in
Australia have met equally stiff political
resistance. In March last year, the government
introduced a Broadcasting Services (Media
Ownership) Amendment Bill. The government
rationale demonstrates the essentially economic
thinking which drives these initiatives:
"The Government's proposed reforms will
improve Australian media companies' access to
capital, facilitate investment in new
technologies, enable media companies to grow and
expand in the new content-driven converging
global media environment, and ensure that
Australian consumers have access to high quality
media offerings. Current restrictions on foreign
and cross-media ownership constrain Australia's
media sector within outdated structures, while
around the world media businesses are being
driven by the imperative of delivering readily
adaptable content across multiple
platforms."
The proposal was
both to remove all restrictions on foreign
ownership, and to relax cross-media ownership
restrictions. Under current Australian rules,
foreign ownership of television licences is
capped at 20 percent and newspapers at 35
percent. Moreover, a television licence holder
cannot own more than 15% of a newspaper in a
capital city. If government proposals were
passed, it would allow both Rupert Murdoch - who
already owns over 50% of the Australian press -
and Kerry Packer to buy up lucrative TV licences
as well.
Although the
government controls the House of Representatives,
a majority in the Senate requires the votes of
four independents. In June, despite extensive
negotiations between Communications minister
Richard Alston and the dissident four which
resulted in substantial amendments, the
Australian government's proposals were defeated.
While Alston bemoaned the loss of an opportunity
to "free up markets in such a way that you
allow the industry to expand", the Tasmanian
senator leading the opposition said he could not
accept that cross-media growth was "in the
interests of the general public". Within
days, the government controlled House of
Representatives had rejected the Senate's
decision and re-passed Alston's legislation.
Alston has announced that he will that demand the
Senate pass it next month.
The
UK
Similar protests
through the second chamber in the UK had a
slightly different outcome, although the
government starting point was much the same.
Ownership proposals from the British Labour
government - which appeared with very little
warning that the government was planning a major
deregulation exercise - also removed restrictions
on foreign ownership of British broadcasting as
well as allowing, for the first time, a major
newspaper group to own a TV station. The rhetoric
in this case was more balanced - the familiar
arguments about wanting to create "the most
dynamic and competitive communications sector in
the world" was balanced by recognition of
the need to protect pluralism and diversity. In
practice, the deeregulation of ownership owed
much more to the former than the latter.
Both proposals
came under vigorous attack not, strangely, in the
elected House of Commons but in the unelected
House of Lords where the government was less able
to exert pressure on individual members to toe
the party line. In the event, the proposal
allowing foreign ownership was passed, paving the
way for major American corporations to buy up
British commercial television and radio stations.
There was more
resistance to the proposal which allowed
newspaper proprietors to buy the second
commercial channel, Five, in what quickly became
known as the "Murdoch clause". Existing
rules prevented any newspaper proprietor with
control of more than 20% of the national press
from owning more than 20% of a commercial
television station, which in practice prohibited
only Murdoch's News International. Once again, it
was vigorous lobbying from non-partisan interest
groups like Public Voice and Voice of the
Listener and Viewer - supported by a few media
academics - which tried to draw attention to the
potential monopoly consequences of allowing a
major newspaper proprietor into television. The
position in Britain is further complicated by
Murdoch's virtual monopoly of the satellite
television platform through BSkyB and fears that
News International would simply exploit a
terrestrial channel to promote its satellite
enterprise.
In the event, a
significant number of Labour peers - including
the film maker Lord Puttnam and commercial TV
director Lord Bragg - made it clear that they
would engineer a government defeat and forced a
concession. The Communications Act now states
that any merger or acquisition has to pass a
"public interest plurality test" and
satisfy both the new regulator Ofcom and the
Secretary of State that the proposed
consolidation will actually add to the plurality
of voices. Given that the final decision still
lies with a senior member of the Cabinet, and
given the sensitivity of political decisions
involving media ownership, the effectiveness of
this compromise has yet to be tested.
It is now quite
possible that in the UK within a few years, one
corporation - and ultimately a single individual
- could control 37% of Britain's national press,
a leading free-to-air television channel and the
dominant means of access to digital television.
No government or opposition spokespeople have
objected to this, although they cannot explain
how this unprecedented concentration of media
power fits with their parties' commitment to
pluralism and the public interest.
Italy
Governments have
less trouble in getting their ownership proposals
through if the owner is also Prime Minister,
which is the current case in Italy.
Interestingly, new Italian proposals appear to be
grounded less in a spirit of market deregulation
than trying to undo all the political
complexities of Berlusconi's conflicts of
interest. On 22 July, the Italian Chamber of
Deputies adopted a new law on communications
drawn up by the communications minister Maurizio
Gasparri. The effect is to raise the ceiling on a
firm's advertising revenue to 20% of the total
media market rather than 30% just of TV
advertising. It also removes the ban on
cross-ownership of television and newspapers from
2009 and sets in motion the partial privatisation
of the state network RAI from 2004.
Most analysts
are agreed that the effect of the bill will be to
allow Mediaset - owned by Berlusconi via his
family-controlled empire Fininvest - to increase
the quality and number of its channels and pull
in more viewers at the expense of RAI. It will
certainly allow Mediaset to keep all three of its
free-to-air channels despite a ruling by Italy's
highest court that one of them should be put on
satellite. On exactly the same day, the Italian
Senate adopted a law allowing Berlusconi to
continue to own private TV channels providing he
does not manage them himself - an interesting
distinction which will be almost certainly be
impossible to implement and police.
The Italian
sector is further complicated by the emergence of
the Murdoch-owned Sky Italia, formed earlier this
year from the merger of pay-TV firms Stream and
Telepiu. Murdoch is now set to dominate the
Italian pay-TV market in much the same way that
his BSkyB dominates in the UK.
The impact of
this kind of dominance by a single powerful
individual was well illustrated in July when the
main RAI evening news bulletin failed to
broadcast the instulting remarks Berlusconi made
in the European Parliament to the German MEP who
challenged him about these conflicts of
interests. This was particularly extraordinary
given the coverage which these ill-time remarks
received throughout the European Union.
The Italian
position is somewhat different from elsewhere in
that the conflicts of interest between high
political office and media owners are
concentrated in a single individual. But the
principles of democratic pluralism versus the
undemocratic risks of media concentration are the
same. One opposition MP therefore criticised the
media bill as "a symbol of, and metaphor
for, the sickness of our democracy". And the
secretary of the Italian national press
federation, Paolo Serventi Longhi said the
measure would act to "the detriment of RAI
and the written press" and was "a
licence to kill off newspapers".
The
Netherlands
I want to talk
briefly about two smaller countries just to offer
some illustration of how the arguments around
media concentration issues alter somewhat when
applied to smaller economies where ecomies of
scale become more important issues.
In both Belgium
and the Netherlands, ownership policy is partly
dictated by competition law and partly by
sector-specific cross-ownership regulation. This
was underlined in the Netherlands by a report on
concentration in the Dutch media in 2001 by their
regulatory body the Commissariaat voor de Media,
CVDM.
The Dutch Media
Act has provisions which impose cross-ownership
restrictions, in particular debarring any concern
which controls at least a quarter of the daily
newspaper market from controlling more than a
third of a commercial broadcaster. At local
level, a company which controls more than half of
the newspaper market can't be licensed as a
broadcaster in the same area unless a public
service broadcaster is also operating in the same
area. A growing company can lose its licence to
broadcast if it becomes too powerful and crosses
these ownership threshholds.
One interesting
point about the CVDM is that - although it is an
independent regulator - it is accountable to the
Minister of Education, Culture and Science who
can suspend or rescind any decision taken by the
regulatory body. The CVDM report, published
earlier this year, concluded that concentration
is increasing with just 3 major players in the
newspaper sector and two commercial players plus
the public broadcaster in television. However, it
specifically acknowledged that new initiatives
can emerge from consolidating groups and that
concentration of ownership does not always have a
negative impact on the evolution of new ideas.
With this in
mind, it specifically recommended that cross
ownership regulation should be relaxed to promote
investment on condition that maximum permissible
shares are defined for each market. It
specifically referred to the significance of
convergence and the fact that current cross
ownership regulations hindered the major
newspaper publishers from exploiting the internet
as a medium of communciation.
These
recommendations were published during the
formation of the new coalition government in May,
and there are so far no published or stated plans
to implement them. However, they almost certainly
represent the current state of thinking on
ownership amongst Dutch politicians, and there
certainly appears to be little scope for
increased regulation.
Belgium
Belgium is a
little more complicated because competition
regulation is imposed at the federal level,
whereas media policy is undertaken separately by
the Flemish Community and the French community.
Within the Flemish sector, there are very few
regulations on media ownership, and the recent
trend has been towards relaxation particularly in
radio and cable. There are practically no
regulations on cross-media ownership, and
broadcasting organisations can merge very easily.
In fact, in 2001
the then Director-General of the public service
broadcaster VRT, Bert De Graeve, and its Chairman
Guy Peeters, complained publicly about the
concentrated media landscape in Flanders. As a
result, the Flemish Media Council compiled a
report which concluded that there was little
regulation, that the Federal Council of
Competition was inefficient and that there was
little cooperation between the Flemish and
Federal level. The then Flemish Minister of Media
ordered a report on concentration from the
consultants Ernst and Young but specifically
ruled out measures which would impose ceilings on
concentration fearing that it would "harm
the pioneering initiative by media entrepreneurs
that were able [through consolidation and
editorial cooperation] to sustain a signficant
number of titles in Flanders". No new
measures are therefore to be implemented because,
according to the Minister, the VCM and the
Council of Competition have sufficient powers to
stop exaggerated concentration.
Regulation
within the French community is undertaken by the
Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) who
delivered a status report on pluralism and
concentration in 2001. There are in fact very few
cross-media regulations beyond a rule preventing
owners of a private TV station from owning more
than 5 radio stations. The CSA concluded that
federal competion law was inadequate to combat
decreases in pluralism, but that "it is
necessary to take into account the [limited] size
of the public sphere and the available resources
in the French community". It therefore
opposed harsh ownership regulation on the basis
that it would be harmful rather than helpful and
concluded that other policy measures should be
adopted. The aim is to maintain pluralism by
making consolidating firms build in enough
diversity through content regulation, rather than
to stop consolidation itself.
Repercussions
So that's a
fairly brief survey of a few randomly chosen
countries, just to give a flavour of
international trends. I think it's a fair
conclusion even on this small sample that the
forces I outlined at the beginning are evident
throughout the developed world. I want to finish
by looking briefly at some of the inherent
problems in this seemingly inexorable shift
towards concentration and consolidation of
ownership.
The biggest
problem is diversity. Every time a government
policy paper on ownership is published, the
rhetoric is all about the need to protect
diversity. Here are two quotes from recent UK
papers, the first from a discussion paper on
ownership in 2001: "We want a plurality of
voices, giving the citizen access to a variety of
views... Competition law.... is not designed to
deliver diversity and plurality in the
media".
The second is
from the previous Conservative government's
consultation on Media Ownership in 1995: "A
free and diverse media are an indispensable part
of the democratic process... Special media
ownership rules... are needed therefore to
provide safeguards necessary to maintain
diversity and plurality". As in other
countries, there is agreement across the
political spectrum: we need to legislate for
pluralism in the mass media because the
mechanisms of the market-place on their own can't
be trusted.
And the reasons
they can't be trusted is because owners influence
content. Their motives may be ideological or
commercial or personal, but ultimately those who
own the media dictate the content. It is
axiomatic that the fewer gatekeepers there are,
the less diversity we have.
It's important
to be realistic about how this process works. In
a few extreme cases, there is evidence of direct
and frequent interference where owners use their
editorial staff effectively as puppets for their
own views. But I think that's the exception. Most
of the time, we're not talking about ham-fisted
table-banging interventions where proprietors
bark their orders about what their writers or
editors should be saying, who they should
commission or what the editorial line should be
each day. It is usually more subtle than that.
Consider this wonderful quote in a letter from
the proprietor of the Telegraph newspapers in
Britain, Conrad Black, to his then editor Max
Hastings about a previous day's editorial with
which Black profoundly disagreed:
"I don't
regard it as my job to instruct the leader
writers, to write the leaders myself, or to
respond to the leaders.... Rather I look forward
to discussing with you how to avoid these
fates".
Another example
from Britain is the sudden affection being
displayed by the Express newspapers for the mayor
of London Ken Livingstone, a man who is second
only to Saddam Hussein in the vitriol heaped upon
him in the British press. Unlike most of the
papers, The Sunday Express effusively praised
Livingstone for introducing a charge on London
motorists for driving into central London. Was
the paper really bowled over by the success of
the mayor's congestion charge, or does it have
something to do with the owner Richard Desmond's
determination to break the distribution monopoly
of his deadly rival Associated Newspapers on
London Underground? Desmond has made no secret of
his wish to start another London newspaper, but
he needs the help of the mayor to break
Associated Newspapers' stranglehold on key sales
points throughout the capital.
And there's the
175 Murdoch owned newspapers around the world,
every one of which supported the war on Iraq.
Anyone with any doubts about Rupert's inclination
to dictate editorial agendas should read the
books written by two of his editors, Harry Evans
and Andrew Neil, or the generally positive
biography by Willie Shawcross.
It's more subtle
for TV, but the influence still works. Murdoch
himself has said that he wants to push his very
successful Sky news service in the same direction
as the tub-thumping, flag-waving Fox News in
America - whose unashamed right-wing bias has
propelled it to the position which CNN held 10
years ago as America's most popular 24 hour news
service.
At a London
seminar last year on ownership, one of the UK's
top independent TV producers who makes programmes
for the ABC network in the US gave us an insight
into the implications of Disney's ownwership of
the network. He said: "the effect of Disney
on ABC is.... actually to do with feel-good and
family. Disney's lawyers and Disney's control of
ABC network says 'this is going to be an American
family network in keeping with the Disney
ethic'". In other words, there are direct
consequences for programme content and diversity
on ABC which flows directly from the editorial
philosophy of the corporate parent. The same is
true, at the other extreme, of the Fox network
which is far more willing to commission violent
and prurient programmes such as "America's
Most Wanted" because it fits with the ethos
of a network which is prepared to push out the
boundaries of acceptability.
The reason I
give these examples is to show that you cannot
legislate away the influences of ownership
through content legislation. Media owners make
their views felt in subtle ways either directly
or through their choice of senior managers and
commissioning editors who do their bidding.
Decisions are taken to protect an owner's
commercial interests or to further an editorial
approach which is consistent with the owner's
view of the world.
And I should add
that, although we are talking essentially about
broadcast and print journalism, much the same
logic applies to music radio. In the UK, the
creative community has been lobbying furiously to
stop the government from allowing consolidation
in the radio industry because the end result is
centralised playlists, much reduced local
discretion, and a homogeneity of musical output
that can crush originality and new talent. All
the evidence from America since consolidation
started seriously in 1996 is that it produces
fewer artists and less musical diversity.
The problem with
all these editorial consequences is that they
cannot be regulated away. You can have
impartiality rules, you can have minimum local
content or regional requirements, you can have
measurements and quotas imposed by regulatory
bodies set up to try and mitigate against the
worst excesses of editorial interference, but you
cannot legislate for the programme that isn't
made, the music that isn't played or the
editorial decision that anticipates your boss's
views on Iraq or anything else. Ultimately if you
want diversity, I think you have to legislate for
diverse ownership. And that is becoming
increasingly difficult.
The reason it is
becoming progressively more difficult is that
politicians are finding it increasingly hard to
stand up to corporate interests. Media
conglomerates want to expand, consolidate and
exploit economies of scale. Front bench
politicians are desperate either to retain power
or regain it, so all political reason seems to
fly out the window. When media owners say jump,
most leading politicians around the world fall
over themselves to see who can jump the highest.
In virtually every country I can think of there
has been a spectacular failure of political
courage on issues of media concentration.
I have
concentrated on diversity and pluralism as the
major threats from consolidation, but I think
there are other consequences which I haven't
discussed in detail. For journalism, I think
there are three particular areas of professional
practice which are likely to suffer.
The first is
localism and regionalism. One of the driving
forces behind consolidation is the need to
centralise in order to cut costs. Major
corporations will insist that they can still
deliver genuinely local content without having
their roots in particular cities, regions or even
countries, but experience suggests otherwise.
Whether it be local radio, local newspapers or
local television, journalism which originates
from those who know and can identify with a
particular area is qualitatively different from
journalism which is practised by those from
outside, often to a very precise formula dictated
by an anonymous corporate centre. The same
problem applies at the state as well as local
level: with the onward march of big, mostly
American, global corporations it becomes more
difficult to protect indigenous national and
regional cultures from the homogenising forces of
American influence.
The second is
investigative journalism. In the preface to its
paper on European Media Ownership, the European
Federation of Journalists talks about "an
increasing perception that journalism is failing
to carry out its watchdog role in society because
of the vested interests that drive the media
business". In other words, the traditional
fourth estate function of uncovering corruption
or abuse of power - whether at corporate or
government level - becomes much more difficult
when the corporate interests of media businesses
are better served by protecting rather than
exposing the establishment. There is also, of
course, the cost factor: good investigative
journalism is more expensive than straight
reporting or confessional journalism, and
corporate centres tend to resist expenditure
which has no immediate return.
Finally, there
is the issue of quality. This is a vague concept
in journalism, but most practising reporters and
editors know the difference between a high
quality journalistic operation which values
accuracy as well as originality, and one that
runs according to flexible professional criteria
which is judged purely on its success in
increasing readers or ratings. American
television news is one generic example of how
news divisions under pressure to deliver ratings
must materially change their output to the
detriment of the mix of stories available to the
American public. One side effect of the move
towards consolidation is the threat being posed
in several countries to public service
broadcasting which has traditionally provided a
benchmark for quality and professionalism and can
rise above the corporate fray. Private
corporations seeking to expand are, throughout
the world, looking enviously at the market shares
of PSBs and gradually weakening the already
flimsy resolve of politicians to maintain public
funding.
I am not trying
to promote a "private bad, public good"
message through this paper, and most countries
have benefited from advertising and subscription
funded media businesses which can operate with
genuine editorial freedom. I am arguing simply
that, to a greater extent than ever before, that
editorial freedom is being eroded by the
inexorable process of global corporate growth and
consolidation; and, moreover, that politicians
around the world are either unwilling or
powerless to stand up for the interests of
independent journalism and therefore a more
informed and robust democracy. It is a depressing
picture, and I would be very happy to be
disabused by those practising at the coalface.
* Steven
Barnett es profesor de
la University
of Westminster, en
Inglaterra. Esta es su participación en la
reunión anual de la Organization of News Ombudsmen, celebrada en Estambul, Turquía, en
septiembre de 2003.
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